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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CWC](#)
SUBJECT: CWC: DESTRUCTION INFORMALS, JULY 13, 2009 (EC-57)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 437
[1](#)B. THE HAGUE 452

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-47-09

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (SBU) On July 13 before the formal opening of the Executive Council (EC), the new EC Chairperson, Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco (Mexico), convened the customary informal consultations on chemical weapons destruction issues. In addition to the usual presentations by the Technical Secretariat (TS) and by Russia, the U.S., Libya, Japan and China, there was an unusually lively discussion of the U.S. and UK report in April on destroyed chemical weapons in Iraq prior to its joining the Convention.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Copies of the TS presentations have been sent to ISN/CB; none of the country presentations were distributed as hand-outs. Detailed notes on all the presentations and the discussion follow.

PRESENTATIONS BY THE TS

[1](#)3. (SBU) Horst Reeps, Director Verification Division, briefed on verification activities since the last informal session in April. He noted that as of June 30, 2009, 45.87% of category 1 and 52% of category 2 CW had been destroyed (not including Libya and Iraq). Currently there are 8 CWDFs in operation: 5 in the United States (Tooele, Pine Bluff, Anniston, Umatilla and Dugway) and 3 in the Russian Federation (Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Shchuchye). Libya completed reloading of mustard, pinacolyl alcohol and isopropyl alcohol at Ruwagha and plans to reload thionyl chloride and phosphorus trichloride later this year, the delay occasioned by the corroded state of the current tankage. Between April 20 and June 30, there have been

inspections of 7 CWPFFs, 5 CWSFs and 1 OCW. Of the 208 Article VI inspections scheduled for 2009, 119 have been completed with 50 inspections, including two Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and analysis, occurring between April 20 and July 12. Article VI inspections resulted in two issues requiring further attention (IRFA) one during a Schedule 1 inspection involving insufficient declaration of Schedule 1 chemicals, and one during a Schedule 2 inspection where ADPA for 2006 and 2008 was unavailable. On time submission of ADPA for 2008 improved over that for 2007 (57 vs 38) with 21 OCPF ADPA submitted in electronic format representing 70% of all declared OCPFs up from 30% in 2008. The TS plans to deliver EDNA of Schedule 2 and 3 declarations later in 2009.

14. (SBU) Stephen Wade, Head Declarations Branch, presented data on CW and Article VI information submitted to the TS between April 17 and July 8, 2009. During the period, 1207 pages of documentation had been received. Three initial Article III declarations had been received from Lebanon (no CW or CW facilities, possession of RCA), Cambodia (no CW or CW facilities, RCA declaration pending) and Bahamas (no CW or CW facilities, possession of RCA). Additionally the TS received the annual reports on destruction for the Russian Federation and Japan; amendments to initial declarations from Australia, Japan, Belgium, Germany, Liberia, Ukraine, Iraq and Libya; 90 day QGermany, Liberia, Ukraine, Iraq and Libya; 90 day reports on CW issues from Libya, the United States, Russian Federation, Japan, China and India; and new OCW discoveries and destruction in the United Kingdom. Fourteen initial declarations have yet to be submitted.

15. (SBU) Dominique Anelli, Head Chemical Demilitarization Branch, briefed on progress in CW destruction. Only items not previously covered by Reeps or Wade are highlighted here. Currently 88.6% of the 70 declared CWPFFs have been converted or destroyed, with 5 left to be destroyed, 3 to be converted (Rabta 1 and 2 in Libya and Novocheboksarsk in the Russian Federation) and 27 under verification. Operations at CWDFs include:

- United States: Tooele, H/HD destruction; Anniston, HD/HT mortars, projectiles, OTCs destruction; Umatilla, H destruction; Pine Bluff, on-going H/HT destruction; Dugway, completed explosive destruction campaign July 10.

- Russian Federation: Maradykovsky, thermal treatment and cutting of mutilated munitions bodies and incineration of hydrolysate reaction mass, preparations for train 2; Leonidovka, draining of hydrolysate reaction mass from aerial munitions; Shchuchye, destruction of 122 mm rocket warheads filled with GB; Pochep received an initial visit by the TS June 29-July 3, 2009, with building in various stages of construction.

- Thirteen States Parties have declared OCW with seven OCW sites in seven States Parties under verification. Three States Parties have declared ACW (China, Italy, Panama). China has 33 ACW sites.

RUSSIAN PRESENTATION

16. (S) Viktor Kholstov of Russia's Ministry of Industry and Trade presented Russia's report orally with no slides or handouts. He stated that Russia's current focus is on meeting its 45%

destruction timeline of December 31, 2009. As of July 13, it had destroyed 34.7% of its CW stockpile at five CWDFs: Gorny, Kambarka (both closed), Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Shchuchye. Kholstov reported that the first Shchuchye operational facility and its train one started up in March 2009 and had destroyed 132,338 artillery shells. At this rate, by year's end the facility would destroy 500 MT of agent. He noted that at Shchuchye, the second destruction line involving reactor technology in the current operational building would start up on July 20 and is expected to destroy 230 MT of GB by year's end. The second Shchuchye facility had its final engineering review in June and is expected to be operational in the 4th quarter, projecting destruction of 1900 MT of agents by year's end. A second reactor-technology-based train is expected to start up in the first half of 2010. Kholstov thanked States Parties for their financial and technical support to Shchuchye for "this truly international facility".

¶17. (S) At Leonidovka, the first destruction train has already drained 65% of hydrolysate reaction mass from aerial munitions and 1000 MT of this reaction mass has been thermally treated. Thirty-two percent of the munitions casings have also been destroyed. Work is ongoing on a second train involving reactor technology, and Russia expects to be ready soon to work with the TS on a facility Qbe ready soon to work with the TS on a facility agreement and detailed plans for destruction. The Pochep CWDF is expected to start up by the end of 2010 and the Kisner CWDF is under construction. Kholstov thanked Canada for its financial support

for this facility's construction.

U.S. PRESENTATION

¶18. (SBU) Dr. Arthur Hopkins, Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, delivered a presentation on the U.S CW demilitarization program. He noted that the United States has met its category 1 CW destruction timelines and that 100% of category 2 and 3 CW and 100% of CWPFs have been destroyed. At present, the United States has destroyed 62.1% of its category 1 CW including 96.6% of its nerve agents. He detailed the destruction progress at each U.S CWDF and noted that the United States, due to the acceleration factors of incentives and experience, was on track to destroy 90% of its CW by April 2012.

¶19. (SBU) Hopkins then described issues causing delays at the ACWA sites, Pueblo and Blue Grass: Congressional requirements for alternative technologies to incineration, involvement of the states in which facilities are located in permit requirements, environmental considerations and safety issues. He presented the timelines for construction operation and closure, with operations at Pueblo projected to be completed in 2017 and at Blue Grass in 2021. He reiterated the U.S. commitment to complete destruction of its CW stockpile in a safe and environmentally responsible manner and emphasized that the United States was continuing to look for ways to accelerate the ACWA sites' CW destruction.

¶10. (SBU) The South African Ambassador said he appreciated U.S. transparency and commitment to the total destruction of its CW stockpile, but observed that if the U.S. misses the 2012 deadline, this

"leaves us in a conundrum" and "we must begin to think about how to deal with the situation in 2012." Careful consideration is needed to manage the situation, he said, without re-writing the Convention, opening the Convention for amendment, or relieving the pressure on possessor States Parties to complete destruction on time.

¶11. (SBU) Iran's delegate from Tehran, Alireza Hajizadeh (formerly posted to The Hague), stated that Iran has been following the destruction since the extension request (2006) and has always been worried about construction of the two sites now extending beyond the destruction deadline. Hajizadeh stated that their delegation requested information about this during the two previous Executive Council sessions, but they were not given much information, and are now hearing about a delay. He said the reasons offered for having to continue destruction activities beyond 2012 were "not convincing", that first financing was raised as an issue and now it is not the issue, then new technology was raised while similar activities were happening in other states in the United States. Hajizadeh asked, "What has been stopping you from starting earlier? Why use new technology? If there are problems, we need action before it is too late. Informing us that 2021 and 2017 are projections, we should not accept this. You should tackle these issues and comply with your obligation. Why not start earlier if you will be using new technology? Qstart earlier if you will be using new technology? What are you doing to accelerate?" He asserted that it was also not convincing that one state in the U.S. can make a decision that does not comply with international obligations, and suggested that the U.S. would not discriminate among states to allow an unsafe method to be used, so why was the new technology proposed if the old technology was safe enough for other states.

¶12. (SBU) Hajizadeh stated that he does not care about internal matters)- only treaty compliance. He said that the United States should abide by its international obligations and asked whether there are "other ways" to comply with internal regulations, whether the first stage could be done now with the residue dealt with at a later time. Dr. Hopkins replied that complying with safety requirements was paramount and that any changes in plans would be difficult due to permit requirements. However, he added, the Obama administration was reviewing the situation and looking at all options for acceleration.

LIBYAN PRESENTATION

¶13. (SBU) Faihi Asseidi, Technical Director of GMP&MSC at Rabta, presented the status of the conversion of Rabta 1 and 2 Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and the situation with the Rabta CW Destruction Facility. In May (28-31), the TS visited Rabta 1 and 2 to assess the status of conversion. He said that Libya would be submitting a national paper prior to October 2009 to the TS detailing why it is necessary to retain the sandbag covered wall to protect the Rabta complex. He then detailed the progress on conversion, which is on schedule for completion in October 2009, with validation and readiness for pharmaceutical production to begin at year's end. Among the photos shown was one of Rabta 1 (building 17A) which showed that the original concrete floor had been replaced with one suitable for pharmaceutical ingredient manufacture.

¶14. (SBU) The situation of the construction of the Rabta CWDF is less positive. Asseidi said that the timeline for 1% destruction, 1 May 2010, may need to be revisited in light of "environmental concerns". A request would be forthcoming to ask for an extension of the deadline. Libya promised to keep the EC informed on its progress.

¶15. (SBU) Following Libya's presentation, the Iranian delegate intervened to urge Libya to "spare no effort" to comply with its current extended deadline and urged other States Parties to help and offer assistance. Hajizadeh asked to see Libya's extension request.

ACW: CHINESE AND JAPANESE PRESENTATIONS

¶16. (SBU) Japan presented its plans for destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China. Masanori Nishi, Director-General of the ACW Office of the Cabinet of Japan, indicated that the number of ACW items at Haerba-ling is 300,000-400,000 and at other locations in China is 46,000. He said that trial excavations of some 641 munitions at Haerba-ling revealed that they are randomly stacked, mixed with other refuse and stuck together, precluding remote, mechanical recovery, and requiring removal by hand. Japan will improve the excavation facilities and resume trial excavations in 2010 with test destruction using mobile destruction facilities (MDFs) in April 2010. Also in April 2010, Japan will place MDFs near Nanjing where it will begin destruction activities with the expectation that over a year's time some 36,000 items will be destroyed.

¶17. (SBU) He Zhenliang, Deputy Director-General and MFA Counselor for CW Abandoned by Japan in China, said that China was concerned that the ACW should be destroyed safely but also within the timelines of the Convention. He outlined the support China has given Japan that included help for the trial excavations at Haerba-ling, assistance to the Japanese MFA to arrange for moving MDF to Nanjing, and assistance to Japan for the disposition in 33 trust warehouses of newly discovered ACW from 70 sites in 16 provinces or municipalities. The Chinese presentation then hammered the Japanese for not destroying a single chemical weapon to date.

DISCUSSION ON RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN IRAQ

¶18. (SBU) Ambassador Siamand Banaa of Iraq stated that since entry into force of the Convention for Iraq, the National Monitoring Directorate, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Industry conducted an assessment of the Falluja and Muthanna sites. Subsequently Iraq had invited the TS to send a team for a "preparation visit". Iraq said the safety of the team would be assured. Banaa thanked States Parties for offers of assistance (Germany, Spain, Serbia). He said that, as a result of Iraq's complex situation, Iraq needed a variety of assistance and offered to circulate a list of requirements.

¶19. (SBU) Iran intervened with an offer to help Iraq. The Iranian delegate then raised the issue of CW destroyed by the U.S. and UK in Iraq before it joined the Convention. On the basis of the UK and U.S. correspondence with the TS, Iran requested that the TS provide a comprehensive report addressing the timelines for its receipt of

RCW information from the U.S. and the UK, what activities took place for destruction, what actions were taken by the TS to verify the information, and what actions were taken to protect the environment. Hajizadeh expressed concern over environmental implications of recent sandstorms moving from Iraq to Iran. He requested the TS report by the next informal meeting.

¶20. (SBU) The South African Ambassador expressed disappointment that no reference was made to RCW in the informal destruction briefings by the TS, but emphasized an interest in looking to the future rather than the past. He wanted to know what the TS is doing about the current RCW reporting and what it intends to do in the future. He called upon the U.S. and the UK to assist in helping the TS develop guidelines to cope with situations like Iraq that might occur in the future, based on their experience in dealing with CW destruction "when people are shooting at you."

¶21. (SBU) Iraqi Ambassador Banaa then took the floor to object to the proceedings. He thanked Iran and South Africa for their interest in the RCW issue, but requested that any such questions should be directed to the Iraqi delegation.

¶22. (SBU) The Director-General stated that, following the invitations from the U.S. and UK governments, the TS will visit both States Parties to review their records and he would report to the next informal meeting prior to EC-58. The DG said that the RCW situation was not anticipated by the Qthat the RCW situation was not anticipated by the Convention, and he concurred with Iran that environmental issues in relation to CW destruction are important.

¶23. (SBU) A lively, but disjointed, series of interventions followed. The Iranian delegate observed that Iran regarded the U.S. and the UK as possessor States Parties occupying Iraq, and that had not addressed Iraq on the RCW issues because the current Iraqi Government was not in charge during the period in question. Iran then concluded by asking the TS what it was going to do about Muthanna. The Director-General referenced the invitation by Iraq for the TS to visit and said plans are now being finalized. The visit will help determine what technical support is needed and to develop plans for destruction and inspection. South Africa followed by restating its call for developing plans to cope with future RCW incidents. Iraq reminded States Parties that it had a list of requirements which it needed to support its efforts.

¶24. (SBU) Del Comment: The destruction informals have in the past been primarily factual presentations with little, if any, discussion. Iraq's plans for destruction, the U.S. and UK role in Iraq from 2003 to 2009, and the U.S. destruction schedules have now put a spotlight on this meeting and another avenue for political discussion of controversial issues. End Comment.

¶25. (U) BEIK SENDS.

GALLAGHER